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NOTE
RENT STRIKES AND TENANT POWER:
SUPPORTING RENT STRIKES IN RESIDENTIAL LANDLORDTENANT LAW
Samantha Gowing*
For more than a century, low-income tenants across cities in the United States
have protested and organized together against unjust housing conditions. Yet
landlords continue to evade accountability, leaving mold, pests, lead paint, unclean water, and innumerable other issues unaddressed. On top of habitability
concerns, the past several decades of gentrification have displaced hundreds of
thousands of Black and brown residents from their communities. To address
these issues, legal reforms have focused on either housing-market regulation or
individual rights devoid of effective enforcement mechanisms. These reforms
fall short. Tenant power, not just tenant-focused housing reform, should be a
concern of policymakers and legal scholars. This Note focuses specifically on
rent strikes as an important organizing strategy that the law can and should
better support. Legislation supporting rent strikes has the potential to offer tenants powerful tools as they organize for their communities and secure access to
quality and affordable housing. This Note proposes a cluster of four legislative
proposals that reflect tenants’ ongoing organizing strategies and, if enacted,
would enhance tenants’ autonomy in their private bargaining with landlords.
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INTRODUCTION
1. First of all, there is no housing crisis.
2. Housing is not in crisis.
3. Housing needs no trauma counselors.
4. Housing needs no lawyers. Housing needs no comrades or friends. Housing needs no representatives. Housing needs no organizers.
5. When we call this crisis a housing crisis, it benefits the people who design
housing, who build housing, who profit from housing, not the people who live in
it.
6. It encourages us to think in abstractions, in numbers, in interchangeable
“units,” and not about people, or about power.
7. We don’t have a housing crisis. We have a tenants’ rights crisis.
—Tracy Jeanne Rosenthal, 101 Notes on the LA Tenants Union 1
The Boyle Heights neighborhood in Los Angeles is a diverse neighborhood with a large Mexican population. Mariachi players still gather at the entryway to Boyle Heights, known as Mariachi Plaza, to play their music. Some
of these mariachis are tenants of a building a few blocks from Mariachi Plaza.
In 2016, they received a notice from their landlord that he was increasing their
rent by 80 percent. 2 Neither the mariachis nor the other tenants in the building, many of whom had lived there for decades, could afford this steep rent
hike. Suspecting their landlord increased rent to price them out, many of the

1. Tracy Jeanne Rosenthal, 101 Notes on the LA Tenants Union, COMMUNE (July 19, 2019),
https://communemag.com/101-notes-on-the-la-tenants-union [perma.cc/U9SN-NBK4]. Tracy
Jeanne Rosenthal is a tenant organizer in Los Angeles and cofounder of the L.A. Tenants Union.
Id.
2. Molly Lambert, The Rent Strike That Sparked a Movement, THELAND, https://
thelandmag.com/mariachi-plaza-rent-strike-defend-boyle-heights [perma.cc/2PU6-UDGT].
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tenants—including some who had not yet received a rent increase—decided
to take action and collectively withhold their rent. 3 The strike went on for
months. The tenants continuously asked the landlord to meet with them to
negotiate. The landlord continuously refused. 4
Almost a year after the initial notice of rent increase, the landlord finally
agreed to negotiate a deal. Under the agreement, the tenants would pay a portion of the withheld rent and a 14 percent rent increase; the landlord conceded
to enter a forty-two-month lease with the tenants and cap yearly rent increases
at 5 percent. 5 Additionally, the landlord agreed to allow the tenants to bargain
collectively going forward. 6 The Boyle Heights rent strike was a huge success
for the tenants, and it has allowed the mariachis to remain in their community
with access to stable and affordable housing. But the tenants did not have a
strong legal basis for withholding rent, and their success was only possible because of their organizing. They avoided eviction during the rent strike through
strategies such as hosting media campaigns to elicit public pressure, picketing
outside the landlord’s house, and withholding rent in large enough numbers
to make eviction inconvenient for the landlord. 7 The law, for the most part,
was not on the tenants’ side.
The driving question of this Note is: What would it look like if the law
were on the tenants’ side? What sort of broad-based, community-driven
change might the law help to flourish if it better supported tenants’ organizing
strategies? Tenants have organized together and used strategies such as rent
strikes for over a century. 8 Yet the most common landlord-tenant legal reforms have focused on enhancing individual rights—such as the push for a
right to counsel in eviction proceedings—and regulatory policies like rent
control laws. 9 Both approaches are important, but their effect will be limited

3. One of the tenants whose rent did not initially increase thought the landlord intended
to divide the tenants and discourage solidarity by serving only a few with a rent increase at first:
“That was his goal. He say I’m gonna divide them, gonna try to maybe get rid of six or seven and
I’m gonna give another few months and then boom, there you go. That was his plan. Because he
just wanted to get rid of us here, one way or the other.” Id.
4. Id.
5. Elijah Chiland, Boyle Heights Mariachis Agree to 14 Percent Rent Hike but Win New
Leases Ending Months-Long Strike, CURBED L.A. (Feb. 16, 2018, 5:46 PM), https://la.curbed
.com/2018/2/16/17018298/boyle-heights-mariachi-gentrification-rent-strike [perma.cc/7U375QCQ].
6. Id.
7. Id.; Lambert, supra note 2.
8. See infra Section I.A.
9. See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes
and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 519–40 (1984) (describing the “revolution” in landlord-tenant law in the 1970s as characterized by a sudden increase in tenants’ individual rights
such as the warranty of habitability and antidiscrimination laws); Brandon M. Weiss, Progressive
Property Theory and Housing Justice Campaigns, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 251, 253–54 (2019) (describing the “most prominent” housing campaigns as those involving state regulation of the
housing market, such as rent control, inclusionary zoning ordinances, and rental-housing quality-inspection programs). For an overview of the campaign for a tenant’s right to counsel in New
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so long as they do not build power for tenants themselves. When tenants lack
political power, these reforms often force tenants to rely on lawyers to assert
their rights in court and empower policymakers to select reforms on the tenants’ behalf. 10 Moreover, these solutions have proven to be woefully inadequate at addressing the overwhelming problems low-income tenants face,
especially in gentrifying cities across the country. 11
This Note argues that a third approach—enhancing tenants’ organizing
and collective bargaining power—is crucial to reforming low-income tenants’
access to quality and affordable housing. Legal systems alone will not give rise
to justice. Rather, change is most likely to happen when people come together
to disrupt the political status quo: in social movements, in protests, and in
other forms of collective action. 12 Collective action both enhances and goes
beyond individual rights and housing-market regulation. It enforces individual rights, allows tenants to gain influence in the political process, and promotes long-term movement building and community-driven change. 13 At the
heart of sustained collective action are powerful mass-membership organizations. Mass-membership organizations promote large-scale, coordinated efforts among working-class people and are a strong force in countering
political inequality in the United States. 14 Labor unions are a notable form of
mass-membership organizations, but tenants also organize through buildingspecific tenants associations as well as city-wide tenants unions. 15
Legal scholars are increasingly concerned with how the law can support
the growth of mass-membership organizations. For instance, Professors Kate
Andrias and Benjamin I. Sachs have explored how the law can facilitate the
conditions necessary for poor and working-class organizations to flourish.
Some of these proposals include providing avenues for obtaining resources
and funding to organize, freedom from retaliation, and the meaningful opportunity to bargain collectively. 16 Others have drawn comparisons between
labor unions and social movements, 17 as well as between labor law and other

York City and how the right to counsel can, in the right context, support tenant power, see John
Whitlow, Gentrification and Countermovement: The Right to Counsel and New York City’s Affordable Housing Crisis, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1081 (2019).
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Section I.A.
12. See infra Section I.A; Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Does Protest Work?, 56 HOW. L.J. 721,
723 (2013).
13. See infra Part II.
14. Kate Andrias & Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and Organizing in an Era of Political Inequality, 130 YALE L.J. 546, 551–52 (2021).
15. See supra Section I.B. For examples of other mass-membership organizations, see
About ASGA, AM. STUDENT GOV’T ASS’N, https://asgahome.com/about-asga [perma.cc/A87F4T3A] (student association); History, INDUS. AREAS FOUND., https://www.industrialareasfoundation.org/history [perma.cc/XBR5-BRZC] (coalition of community organizations).
16. See generally Andrias & Sachs, supra note 14.
17. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The Impact of Labor Unions on Worker Rights and on
Other Social Movements, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 267 (2011).

March 2022]

Rent Strikes and Tenant Power

881

sectors where mass-membership organizations are prevalent. 18 Christopher
Bangs has even proposed potential statutory frameworks that would support
tenant organizing, including laws to protect individual tenants’ right to organize without retaliation and tenants unions’ right to self-fund. 19
This Note adds to this developing literature by focusing on how legal reforms can enhance an important element of tenants’ collective bargaining
power: the rent strike. 20 Rent strikes take place when tenants decide to collectively stop paying rent. Such strikes are only one tool in the larger bargaining
strategy. Because they are risky for tenants and expose tenants to a heightened
threat of eviction, rent strikes typically follow extensive attempts to bargain
with the landlord and otherwise protest the issues the tenants are facing.
Rent strikes are often frowned upon for being too radical and for going
around, rather than through, the legal system. 21 However, strikes not only enhance tenants’ collective bargaining rights but also enable them to resist oppression. The current landlord-tenant structure plays a key role in systemic
oppression and cycles of wealth disparities in the United States. In other areas
of the law—namely, labor law—legal reformers have supported collective bargaining power as a means of disrupting systemic oppression. The National
Labor Relations Act’s key ambition was to address the imbalance of bargaining power between employers and employees. 22 When workers strike, they
gain bargaining power by withholding something of value from their employer—their labor—without being fired. 23 Policymakers and lawyers advocating for policy change today should similarly aim to ensure tenants have the
power to withhold the value they provide to landlords—their rent—without
an unchecked risk of eviction.
This Note recommends a cluster of four legal reforms that can support
rent strikes. In doing so, it seeks to follow a movement law methodology,
which calls for grounding legal scholarship “in solidarity, accountability, and

18. See Christopher Bangs, Note, A Union for All: Collective Associations Outside the
Workplace, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 47 (2018).
19. Id. at 74–87.
20. Other aspects of tenants’ collective bargaining—such as the possibilities for scaling up
bargaining units—are important to consider but outside the scope of this Note. Cf. KATE
ANDRIAS & BRISHEN ROGERS, ROOSEVELT INST., REBUILDING WORKER VOICE IN TODAY’S
ECONOMY 6–7 (2018), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-RebuildingWorker-Voice-201808.pdf [perma.cc/4QCR-HNN4] (discussing sectoral bargaining as a means
for scaling up bargaining units in labor law).
21. See, e.g., Mayor Opposes New York Rent Strike, REAL EST. WKLY. (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://rew-online.com/mayor-opposes-new-york-rent-strike [perma.cc/EWN5-KQW7].
22. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
23. Unfortunately, this is not to say that the NLRA has been successful at protecting workers’ right to withhold their labor without being fired. Employers can permanently replace striking workers or threaten to replace them to break up the strike. Permanent replacement is “one
of the most devastating antiunion tactics used by American employers,” and its legality is a
widely criticized part of labor law. John Logan, Permanent Replacements and the End of Labor’s
“Only True Weapon,” 74 INT’L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 171, 171 (2008).
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engagement with grassroots organizing and left social movements.” 24 The
purpose of this Note is not to challenge modes of tenant organizing, nor is it
to lay out what makes for an effective bargaining strategy. 25 Rather, this Note
is motivated by a strategy tenants are already using—rent strikes—and an interest in how the law can better support that strategy. 26 Part I provides a brief
history of the role rent strikes have played in movements for racial justice, as
well as background on the legality of tenant organizing and rent withholding.
Part II explores the shortcomings of the major landlord-tenant reforms, arguing that rent-strike legislation would support not only tenants’ legal right to
organize but also their ability to build collective power. Part III offers four
proposed policy changes to support rent strikes, which focus on strengthening
tenant autonomy and organizing.

24. Amna A. Akbar, Sameer M. Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement Law, 73 STAN. L.
REV. 821, 821 (2021).
25. For an example of such an approach, see Bo Bengtsson, Tenants’ Dilemma—on Collective Action in Housing, 13 HOUS. STUD. 99 (1998).
26. To ask how laws can support organizing strategies is, from the start, a limited approach. For example, this Note recognizes that housing is a human right; the laws of the United
States, however, do not. See Maria Massimo, Note, Housing as a Right in the United States: Mitigating the Affordable Housing Crisis Using an International Human Rights Law Approach, 62
B.C. L. REV. 273, 276 (2021). Those who cannot pay rent are thus typically denied the right to
decent housing. Id. at 289–90. While proposals to lower striking tenants’ risk of eviction are in
solidarity with the tenants’ rent-strike strategy, they certainly fall short of overhauling the affronts to human dignity that are widespread displacement and houselessness in the United
States. See infra text accompanying notes 44–51; Benjamin Schneider, CityLab University: Understanding Homelessness in America, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (July 6, 2020, 10:29 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-07-06/why-is-homelessness-such-a-problem-in-u-s-cities [perma.cc/S69M-F87Q]; Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity
Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss
and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 796 (2016). True accountability to tenant
organizing requires alignment with tenants’ visions for radically altered power structures and
land rights. See, e.g., Black Land & Liberation Initiative, MOVEMENT GENERATION,
https://movementgeneration.org/our-work/movementbuilding-2/black-land-and-liberationinitiative [perma.cc/GZ3J-TAFX]; see also infra note 65. See generally Sara Safransky, Rethinking
Land Struggle in the Postindustrial City, 49 ANTIPODE 1079 (2017) (using ethnographical methodology to examine racialized land dispossession in Detroit through the lens of ongoing struggles for liberation and decolonization). Rent strikes are part of this broader liberatory movement,
and this Note takes the position that the law can support the movement by removing barriers to
rent strikes and community organizing.
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CONTEXTUALIZING RENT STRIKES

9. A tenant can be harassed, evicted, displaced, broke, undocumented, fed
up, or organized. A tenant can be in kindergarten, can be a teacher, or a teacher
on strike.
10. A tenant can be incarcerated or houseless.
11. In LATU we define a tenant as more than a renter. A tenant is anyone
who doesn’t control their own housing.
—Tracy Jeanne Rosenthal, 101 Notes on the LA Tenants Union 27
The housing market has long played a role in racial and class oppression
in American history. Low-income tenants are especially vulnerable to abuse
and mistreatment because they lack control over their housing and thus the
ability to change their circumstances when issues arise. When tenants organize, they strive to reclaim control over the safety and affordability of their communities. This Part discusses the role rent strikes have played in historic and
ongoing movements for racial justice. It then provides background on the existing legal structures for tenant organizing and rent withholding. Although
rent-strike legislation would require a significant departure from the landlord-tenant status quo, the existing legal framework provides a foundation
upon which to build greater protections for rent strikes.
A. Rent Strikes and Racial Justice
Historically, rent strikes have served as a major tool in the broader movement against housing discrimination and racial injustice. Housing was a central issue in the civil rights movement. 28 Following World War II, as white
people fled to the suburbs, racial minorities made up an increasing majority
of inner-city populations. 29 Burdened by racist federal housing policies, 30 residents of city centers faced a shrinking tax base, fewer job opportunities, and

27. Rosenthal, supra note 1. This Note uses a narrower definition of a residential “tenant”
(that is, someone who lives in a housing unit and has possessory rights but not ownership rights
as to that unit) that does not encompass those who are incarcerated or houseless. However, this
broader definition of “tenant” is important to understanding tenant organizing and the harms
perpetuated by an unjust housing market.
28. See Leonard S. Rubinowitz, The Chicago Freedom Movement and the Federal Fair
Housing Act, in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT: MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTIVISM IN THE NORTH 115 (Mary Lou Finley, Bernard LaFayette Jr., James R. Ralph
Jr. & Pam Smith eds., 2016).
29. Robert A. Solomon, Building a Segregated City: How We All Worked Together, 16 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 265, 265 (1997).
30. LANCE FREEMAN, A HAVEN AND A HELL: THE GHETTO IN BLACK AMERICA 72 (2019)
(describing how the “federal government’s enormous influence and resources” were invested
into discriminatory policies such as redlining that brought about the “federally sanctioned
ghetto”).
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deplorable housing conditions. 31 By the 1960s, segregation had been outlawed
and the numbers of Black voters and elected officials had increased, but innercity housing conditions only worsened. 32 Within the context of the nationwide civil rights and Black Power movements, Black tenants began taking on
smaller-scale rent-strike actions to achieve local and more immediate relief. 33
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, rent strikes were common across the country. 34
The strikes not only served as a concrete method of addressing terrible
living conditions and unaffordable rents; they also allowed the tenants to have
control over the terms by which these issues were addressed. In the St. Louis
rent strike of 1969, for example, tenants went on strike and successfully negotiated specific demands: rents capped at 25 percent of a tenant’s income, improved pest control, better security measures, and more Black representation
on the housing authority’s board of commissioners. 35 The striking tenants in
St. Louis were predominantly Black women who drew influence from the
Black Power and Women Power movements. 36 A key tenet of Women Power
was the belief that “if the Negro in America is to strive toward developing a
meaningful self-identification, then this fundamental concept of ‘self-help’
projects becomes increasingly important in this complex realm of social revolution.” 37 Rent strikes like the one in St. Louis provided tenants with a “selfhelp” method of improving their community, thus bringing to bear the tenants’ value of self-determination. 38
Today, racism and inhumane living conditions continue to pervade the
rental housing market. Unaddressed mold issues in public housing are causing children to develop asthma at increasing rates. 39 A prominent New York
City landlord has an average of 2,877 open code violations in each of his fifteen
apartment complexes, including for rodent infestation, mold, heat outages,

31. Id. at 4, 138.
32. Id. at 133–34.
33. Michael Karp, The St. Louis Rent Strike of 1969: Transforming Black Activism and
American Low-Income Housing, 40 J. URB. HIST. 648, 650 (2014); John C. Fossum, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 304, 323 (1965) (“[T]he
existing civil rights groups have supplied many of the leaders of the [rent] strikes as well as the
inspirational impetus of a dynamic cause.”).
34. Karp, supra note 33; see, e.g., Sarah Judson, “We’re Walking Proud and Talking Loud
Because We’re the New Black Joes!”: Community Leadership and Tenants Rights in Asheville’s
1968 Rent Strike, 46 J. URB. HIST. 816 (2020); Brown-Nagin, supra note 12, at 736–38.
35. Karp, supra note 33, at 652–57.
36. Id. at 653.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. Molly Parker, Inside Public Housing Where Cockroaches Drop from the Wall and Kids
Are Getting Sick, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 12, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-public-housing-where-cockroaches-drop-from-the-wall-and-kids-are-getting-sick [perma.cc
/QHV2-ZNB2].
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and lead paint. 40 Reports from across the country tell similar stories about the
status of low-income rental housing. 41 Racial minorities are at a greater risk of
facing these issues: due to historical and ongoing discrimination, Black, Native American, and Latino renters are more likely to be low-income than white
renters. 42 And among low-income renters, Black renters are most likely to
spend more than 50 percent of their income on rent. 43
At the same time, gentrification has added a new and daunting layer to
the challenges low-income tenants face. Gentrification is a neighborhoodlevel process of colonization, in which predominantly white, privileged classes
appropriate urban space and culture while forcing out existing communities. 44
Its main features include “housing dislocation and loss, distended social networks, ‘improved’ local services out of sync with local needs and displacement.” 45 City governments often couch their plans for gentrification in terms
like “neighborhood revitalization,” suggesting that gentrification benefits
communities. 46 Unlike actual community development, however, gentrification fails to invest in the people already present in a community. Instead, the

40. Alex Williamson, Tenants Withhold Rent from City’s Worst Landlord, BKLYNER (Sept.
8, 2020), https://bklyner.com/tenants-withhold-rent-from-citys-worst-landlord [perma.cc/
U5MZ-SQFX].
41. See, e.g., Alexa Mills & Andrew Giambrone, Life Is Hell for Tenants of Giant D.C.
Slumlord Sanford Capital, WASH. CITY PAPER (Feb. 2, 2017), https://washingtoncitypaper.com/article/192384/life-is-hell-for-tenants-of-giant-dc-slumlord-sanford-capital [perma.cc
/ZLY8-XMNA]; MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY
76 (2016) (“Between 2009 and 2011, nearly half of all renters in Milwaukee experienced a serious
and lasting housing problem. . . . Yet the average rent was the same, whether an apartment had
housing problems or did not.”).
42. ANDREW AURAND ET AL., NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., THE GAP: A SHORTAGE
OF AFFORDABLE HOMES 2 (2021), https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2021.pdf [perma.cc/V9ME-HJRT].
43. Id. at 7.
44. Rowland Atkinson & Gary Bridge, Introduction, in GENTRIFICATION IN A GLOBAL
CONTEXT 1, 2 (Rowland Atkinson & Gary Bridge eds., 2005). Although the term “gentrification”
is used in many contexts today, it was first coined by British sociologist Ruth Glass to describe
working-class Londoner’s displacement from the city by middle-class newcomers. JASON
RICHARDSON, BRUCE MITCHELL & JUAN FRANCO, NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL.,
SHIFTING NEIGHBORHOODS: GENTRIFICATION AND CULTURAL DISPLACEMENT IN AMERICAN
CITIES 8 (2019), https://ncrc.org/gentrification [perma.cc/P2XE-ET6Y]. Some scholars debate
whether displacement is an inherent element of gentrification. E.g., id. at 10–11. This Note uses
gentrification to refer to instances in which the process of urban development either displaces
or threatens to displace the predominantly minority communities present in a city—acknowledging that when a community is not displaced due to gentrification, it is often attributable to
the community’s resistance and organizing rather than to the developers’ investment in lowincome communities of color. See, e.g., Kathe Newman & Elvin K. Wyly, The Right to Stay Put,
Revisited: Gentrification and Resistance to Displacement in New York City, 43 URB. STUD. 23, 23,
50 (2006) (documenting the “sophisticated and creative array of methods used to resist displacement”).
45. Atkinson & Bridge, supra note 44, at 2.
46. See Barrett A. Lee, Daphne Spain & Debra J. Umberson, Neighborhood Revitalization
and Racial Change: The Case of Washington, D.C., 22 DEMOGRAPHY 581, 581 (1985). While this
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city “revitalizes” the urban environment, partnering with private developers to
bring in upscale apartments and “beautification” initiatives. 47 In the meantime, skyrocketing rent prices and increased policing 48 disrupt and displace
existing communities. 49 In recent decades, 135,000 people of color have been
pushed out of major cities across the country. 50
Gentrification destroys value that cannot be quantified based on a developer’s estimated market rate of a piece of land. In Boyle Heights, Los Angeles,
the community reclaimed a blighted lot in 1999 and turned it into a community garden. 51 After nearly twenty years of the garden providing the community with a safe space to gather and a source of healthy, local food, the
landowner chose to lease the land to a developer. 52 “They couldn’t see what
we were doing . . . . The value we create,” said Irene Peña, director of the garden: 53

Note focuses on the role of cities in both causing and fighting the dispossession of homes and
communities from people of color, the federal government has also played a role in gentrification. See, e.g., Derek Hyra, Commentary: Causes and Consequences of Gentrification and the Future of Equitable Development Policy, 18 CITYSCAPE, no. 3, 2016, at 171, 172 (discussing the
HOPE VI program’s use of billions of federal dollars to demolish public housing near central
business districts).
47. See Georgia Alexandri, Reading Between the Lines: Gentrification Tendencies and Issues of Urban Fear in the Midst of Athens’ Crisis, 52 URB. STUD. 1631, 1643 (2015).
48. The increased policing that accompanies gentrification has put the safety of communities of color at greater risk. Research shows that as property values increase, so do arrests, injuries, and killings of people of color at the hands of police. See Brenden Beck, The Role of Police
in Gentrification, APPEAL (Aug. 4, 2020), https://theappeal.org/the-role-of-police-igentrification-breonna-taylor [perma.cc/ZQQ7-ST4V]. After Breonna Taylor was killed by police when
they raided her home in the middle of the night, her family’s lawyers filed a lawsuit against the
City of Louisville. The lawyers allege in part that the raid of Taylor’s home was “part of a broader
effort to evict residents who were impeding the city’s Vision Russell redevelopment initiative.”
Id.
49. For more perspectives on gentrification as colonization, see Jean-Paul D. Addie &
James C. Fraser, After Gentrification: Social Mix, Settler Colonialism, and Cruel Optimism in the
Transformation of Neighbourhood Space, 51 ANTIPODE 1369 (2019) and Stefan Kipfer, Fanon
and Space: Colonization, Urbanization, and Liberation from the Colonial to the Global City, 25
ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 701 (2007).
50. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 44, at 4. From 2000 to 2013, “[m]ore than 20,000
[B]lack residents of Washington, D.C., nearly 15,000 in New York City and 12,000 in Philadelphia” were forced to leave gentrifying neighborhoods. Id. at 20. Displacement resulting from
urban development is occurring not just in the United States. The Red Cross reports that fifteen
million people across the globe are displaced each year due to development projects. INT’L FED’N
OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOC’YS, WORLD DISASTERS REPORT 14 (2012), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1216800-WDR%2B2012-EN-LR.pdf [perma.cc
/MH3Z-ZHXC].
51. Yxta Maya Murray, The Takings Clause of Boyle Heights, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 109, 133 (2019).
52. See id. at 133–34.
53. Id. at 133.
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In planting the herbs that we did, we created a cultural practice. . . . [C]ultural traditions are very empowering for immigrant families that feel disconnected to their roots. And when you have that empowerment, that can feed
into the health practices of the community, too. Everything strengthens everything else.
. . . And then, they just forced us out. 54

The consequences of this disruption—“the loss and grief of a neighbourhood
abandoned, the bulldozing of a home, the erasing of memories or the shattering of lives”—create lasting trauma for the people of color forced out of their
communities. 55
In response to gentrification, rent strikes have returned as a popular organizing strategy. 56 While rent strikes continue to enforce the right to habitable living conditions, they have also become a form of protest for tenants faced
with rising rent prices to assert their “right to stay put.” 57 As the threat of displacement grows to severe levels in American cities, tenants have been willing
to engage in riskier organizing tactics. From 2016 to 2018, tenants in Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., New York City, San Francisco, Minneapolis, and
other cities held rent strikes to bargain for better conditions and affordable

54. Id. at 135.
55. Libby Porter, Possessory Politics and the Conceit of Procedure: Exposing the Cost of
Rights Under Conditions of Dispossession, 13 PLAN. THEORY 387, 397 (2014). For a detailed account of the lasting trauma that stem from gentrification and displacement, see MINDY
THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: HOW TEARING UP CITY NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS
AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (New Village Press, 2d ed. 2016) (2004).
56. Rachel Kaufman, Rent Strikes Heating Up Nationwide, Say Tenant Organizers, NEXT
CITY (June 11, 2018), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/rent-strikes-heating-up-nationwide-saytenant-organizers [perma.cc/N56E-4UFE].
57. See Dominic T. Moulden, Gregory D. Squires & Aristotle Theresa, Opinion, The Right
to Stay Put, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rightto-stay-put/2018/09/21/395cc5d8-b90f-11e8-94eb-3bd52dfe917b_story.html [perma.cc/UXE5V6FY]. See generally Chester Hartman, The Right to Stay Put, in LAND REFORM, AMERICAN
STYLE 302 (Charles C. Geisler & Frank J. Popper eds., 1984) (establishing the principle that lowincome residents of an area have a right to “stay put” and resist displacement despite increasing
demand from wealthier newcomers).
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rents. 58 The COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated the affordable housing
crisis, and 2020 saw some of the largest rent strikes in U.S. history. 59
For tenants fighting to stay in their communities, rent strikes are not just
about fixing issues with their housing; they are about fighting for control over
their own housing. 60 “I’ve realized that we should all have control of our
homes,” said Timothy Brown, a Minneapolis tenant who went on strike in
2018. 61 “My community and I deserve to stay in our homes. We also deserve
to have a say in what happens with our homes.” 62 The power imbalance between landlord and tenant perpetuates cycles of power and wealth disparities
that continue to oppress people of color in the United States. 63 Through their
powerful tenant organizing, community organizers are able to “critique the
legal, social, and political structures around them” and experiment with political work that “enlarge[s] the idea of what is possible.”64 Policymakers and
lawyers advocating for change should follow the lead of tenant organizers,

58. Rob Kuznia, Los Angeles Tenants Increasingly Engaging in Rent Strikes amid Housing
Crisis, WASH. POST (June 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/los-angeles-tenants-increasingly-engaging-in-rent-strikes-amid-housing-crisis/2018/06/02/6b91c340-65af11e8-a768-ed043e33f1dc_story.html [perma.cc/FKG9-35CK]; Marissa J. Lang, Rent Strikes
Grow in Popularity Among Tenants as Gentrification Drives Up Rents in Cities Like D.C., WASH.
POST (June 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/rent-strikes-grow-in-popularityamong-tenants-as-gentrification-drives-up-rents-in-cities-like-dc/2018/06/09/f953e0ca-651711e8-a768-ed043e33f1dc_story.html [perma.cc/AV2R-3L3E]; Grand Concourse Tenants
Launch Rent Strike Protesting Conditions in Historic Building, LEGAL SERVS. NYC (Feb. 2, 2016),
https://www.legalservicesnyc.org/news-and-events/press-room/978-grand-concourse-tenantslaunch-rent-strike-protesting-conditions-in-historic-building [perma.cc/N5GP-DMP3]; Joe
Kukura, Midtown Tenants Fight City Hall to Avoid Demolition, SF WKLY. (Apr. 27, 2018, 6:57
PM), https://www.sfweekly.com/news/midtown-tenants-fight-city-hall-to-avoid-demolition
[perma.cc/2BJT-SAVG]; Michelle Bruch, Renters Go On Strike, SW. J. (Mar. 7, 2018, 10:12 AM),
https://www.southwestjournal.com/news/2018/03/renters-go-on-strike [perma.cc/6E9X-F5C3];
subMedia, This Is Parkdale, YOUTUBE (Nov. 3, 2017), https://youtu.be/cCHAkCxDPjg.
59. See Natasha Lennard, With Millions Unable to Pay for Housing Next Month, Organizers Plan the Largest Rent Strike in Nearly a Century, INTERCEPT (Apr. 25, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2020/04/25/coronavirus-rent-strike-may [perma.cc/E6XF-RZDZ]; Daniel Boguslaw, Rent Strike Nation, NEW REPUBLIC: SOLD/SHORT (Mar. 30, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/157081/rent-strike-nation-coronavirus [perma.cc/3HBF-59Z6].
60. Elizabeth K. Johnson, Metes and Bounds—Collective Tenant Action: Should the Rent
Strike Be Institutionalized?, 46 L.A. BAR BULL. 138, 163 (1971).
61. Timothy Brown, Despite Win Against Landlord, Minneapolis Tenants Still Face Eviction, SHELTERFORCE (July 11, 2018), https://shelterforce.org/2018/07/11/despite-win-againstlandlord-minneapolis-tenants-still-face-eviction [perma.cc/WRS2-YEZ4].
62. Id.
63. See infra Section II.C.
64. Akbar et al., supra note 24, at 840 (quoting LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE
MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 37
(2002)).
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questioning the choice to value property ownership over the health of communities 65 and imagining not only new policies but also alternative structures
of power that the law can help bring about. 66
B. The Legal Landscape for Tenant Organizing
Throughout this long and vibrant organizing history, the law has played
only a small role in tenant organizing. Tenants organize at the building level,
across neighborhoods and cities, and through national networks. The Autonomous Tenants Union Network (ATUN), a collaborative of twenty-six tenants unions, defines a tenants union as “a group of tenants who have a strategy
for building tenant power beyond one particular building or complex.” 67
These tenants unions are not incorporated as nonprofits or otherwise registered with a state agency, and they are funded primarily by membership fees
rather than grants or government funding. 68 Internally, some tenants unions
employ a leadership strategy of “horizontalism.”69 The L.A. Tenants Union
defines horizontalism as a strategy for “collectivity, collective decision-making, and accountability,” one which encourages “transformative participation” from members rather than limiting decisionmaking to a small group of
higher-ups. 70 These features differentiate horizontalist tenants unions from

65. Progressive property theorists have provided a new way to consider the value system
underlying property law. Progressive property theory argues that property law should be rooted
in the promotion of human flourishing, the ability of each person to access necessary resources,
and the development of communities free from exploitation. See Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo
M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S. Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009). For an analysis of progressive property theory as applied
to housing-reform movements, see Weiss, supra note 9, at 262.
66. Building alternative structures of power is about more than redistributing who has
power. It involves new ways of conceptualizing and structuring power. Organizers often make the
distinction between “dominant power” and “relational power.” CTR. FOR CMTY. ENGAGEMENT &
SERV. LEARNING, UNIV. OF DENVER, COMMUNITY ORGANIZING HANDBOOK 27 (3d ed. 2014),
https://www.du.edu/ccesl/media/documents/ccesl_handbook_third_edition_print_protected.pdf
[perma.cc/655Y-F3JN]. “[D]ominant power is a zero-sum game where power is used over others
in a one directional way.” Id. On the other hand, “relational power is built through social influence and the collective power of people coming together to work with one another.” Id. The
following Section briefly discusses how tenants unions have adopted nonhierarchical leadership
structures, illustrating a nondominant power structure in practice.
67. Join ATUN, AUTONOMOUS TENANTS UNION NETWORK, https://atun-rsia.org/joinatun
[perma.cc/J9A5-L7FB]; see also Who We Are, AUTONOMOUS TENANTS UNION NETWORK,
https://atun-rsia.org/who-we-are [perma.cc/6TYD-PDQ3]; Tenants Unions in North America,
AUTONOMOUS TENANTS UNION NETWORK, https://atun-rsia.org/tenants-unions [perma.cc/8XJ6JWZQ].
68. Who We Are, supra note 67 (“We are not under the direction of paid staff, boards of
directors, or state agencies, and we are funded primarily by our members rather than by grants
or major donors.”).
69. See, e.g., L.A. TENANTS UNION, NAMING THE MOMENT 2018, at 14 (2019), https://latenantsunion.org/en/2019/09/09/naming-the-moment-2018 [perma.cc/VYH3-P89Y].
70. See id.
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labor unions, which are formal legal entities with structured leadership positions. 71
Few laws exist that recognize tenant groups as collective actors. The ones
that do focus on smaller-scale tenants groups, such as an association for a single apartment complex. 72 The District of Columbia is the only jurisdiction in
which tenants can form a tenants organization with the power to bargain as a
single unit with the landlord. 73 Some scholars posit that facilitating tenants
unions’ incorporation and recognition as legal entities would improve landlord-tenant relations and unions’ effectiveness. 74 As the ATUN’s Points of
Unity make clear, however, tenants unions in the ATUN value their independence from legal institutions and the restrictions that institutionalization
entails. 75 By operating outside the formal legal infrastructure, tenants unions
lack the protections and legal support afforded, for example, to labor unions 76—but they also remain uninhibited by government restrictions and regulations. 77 This Note does not argue that the law should aim to create a more
standardized structure for tenants unions. Rather, it argues that the law should
aim to support the strategies that tenant organizers are already using without
imposing legal restrictions they have not called for.
Despite the limited legal framework for tenants groups, most jurisdictions
have at least some laws protecting tenants’ rights to organize. A majority of
states have adopted some form of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA), which prohibits landlords from retaliating against tenants

71. See, e.g., AFSCME, OFFICERS HANDBOOK 14 (2017), https://www.afscme.org/about/governance/document/Officers-Handbook.pdf [perma.cc/9HGY-95AA]; see
also Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793, 839 (1984) (describing
how the underrepresentation of “black, female, and other ethnic minority workers” means that
“union negotiators often do not reflect the aspirations and priorities of their constituents”). Not
all tenant groups follow the ATUN model. Some tenants unions that are not part of the ATUN
choose to incorporate as nonprofits and follow more traditional leadership models. See e.g.,
TU Staff and Board, TENANTS UNION OF WASH. STATE, https://tenantsunion.org/about/tenants-union-staff-board [perma.cc/5LKN-H4XA]; Help Support Us, TEX. TENANTS’ UNION,
https://txtenants.org/help-support-us [perma.cc/KU8L-UTV6].
72. See, e.g., Forming a Tenant Association (as per TOPA), ULS HOMEWORKS, http://ulshomeworks.org/tenant/forming.aspx [perma.cc/4WX9-EBF8].
73. D.C. CODE § 42-3404.02a (2001) (limiting a “tenant organization” to an organization
formed within “a housing accommodation of 5 or more units”); Bangs, supra note 18, at 59; D.C.
CODE § 42-3505.06(b) (2001) (establishing that tenants have the right to “meet and confer
through representatives of their own choosing with an owner”). Some jurisdictions require tenants associations to incorporate as nonprofits before they can take advantage of certain benefits.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 42-3404.08, .11 (2001). Tenants associations often stand alone, but in
some cities they are part of a neighborhood network or city-wide union. See, e.g., Locals, L.A.
TENANTS UNION, https://latenantsunion.org/en/locals [perma.cc/P7D7-U8BT].
74. See H. Edward Hales Jr. & Charles H. Livingston, Note, Tenant Unions: Their Law
and Operation in the State and Nation, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 79, 86–87 (1970).
75. See Who We Are, supra note 67.
76. See Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169,
196–98 (2015) (describing the “unusual powers” that federal labor law affords labor unions).
77. See infra Section II.C; Estlund, supra note 76, at 199–204.
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when they organize or participate in tenants groups. 78 Thirty-two jurisdictions give tenants some form of protection against landlord retaliation for organizing and protesting. 79 New York, California, and the District of Columbia
have particularly strong protections for tenants compared to other jurisdictions, 80 including the right for tenant organizers to canvass in multifamily
housing 81 and the right to obtain information from landlords in certain circumstances. 82 These legal protections support tenants unions by providing individual tenants with legal support that encourage tenants to build up massmembership organizations and protect them from legal liability and retaliation when they do. 83 However, nineteen states still do not have general protections for tenant organizing. 84 Additionally, no jurisdiction requires the
landlord to bargain with the tenants or a tenants association. 85
C. Legality of Rent Withholding
In a limited way, the law already supports a very narrow category of rent
withholding. Today, tenants in some jurisdictions have a legal right to withhold rent in response to uninhabitable living conditions. Until the 1970s,
courts considered tenants’ obligations under a lease to be independent of an
owner’s obligations as a landlord: if a landlord breached the statutory duty to
keep the property up to code, the tenant still had to pay rent or else face eviction. 86 The D.C. Circuit, in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., was one of the
first courts to reverse this rule, holding instead that the obligations between
landlord and tenant are dependent on one another: if a landlord fails to keep
the property adequately maintained, the tenant may continue to reside in the
property without paying some or all of the rent owed. 87 This right, called the
warranty of habitability, imposes affirmative obligations on the landlord to

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Bangs, supra note 18, at 60–61.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
See D.C. CODE § 42-3505.06(b), (c) (2001).
See N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 22-b(3) (McKinney 2015).
See Andrias & Sachs, supra note 14, at 560–61.
Bangs, supra note 18, at 61.
See id. at 59–60.
Rabin, supra note 9, at 524.
428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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the tenant; in Javins, the tenant’s right to withhold rent served as an enforcement mechanism for when the landlord failed to meet this obligation. 88 However, only some jurisdictions recognize a tenant’s right to withhold rent when
the landlord breaches the warranty of habitability. 89
Even among jurisdictions that do allow tenants to withhold rent, tenants
are typically required to place rent in an escrow account until the landlord
makes the necessary repairs. The URLTA provides that a court “may order the
tenant to pay into court all or part of the rent accrued and thereafter accruing.” 90 In some jurisdictions, tenants can use rent-withholding laws as a selfhelp remedy by placing rent into an escrow account without prior judicial review of their basis for withholding. 91 In other jurisdictions, however, tenants
must receive court approval before they can start withholding rent via an escrow account. 92 To take advantage of rent-withholding laws, tenants must be
current on their rent and not otherwise in violation of the lease. 93
When a tenant withholds rent outside of legal protections for doing so,
the landlord has the legal right to evict the tenant. 94 But the landlord must go
through the judicial process. Tenants have the right not to be subject to a landlord’s use of self-help—such as the landlord changing the locks to prevent the
tenant from entering the property, removing the tenant’s belongings, or cutting off water and other utilities—to repossess the property after the tenant
breaches the lease. 95 Even if the tenant is in breach of the lease and the landlord
has the right to repossess the property, the landlord’s exclusive remedy, unless
in a jurisdiction that expressly preserves self-help remedies, is to apply for a
“show cause” hearing for the eviction of a tenant and to receive an eviction
order from the court. 96 Eviction hearings occur very soon after the tenant is
served with notice—typically within days. 97 In Lindsey v. Normet, the Supreme
Court upheld the speed of the eviction process. 98 Landlords argue that eviction

88. See Rabin, supra note 9, at 526. For a table delineating the source of law for each state’s
warranty of habitability, see Jana-Ault Phillips & Carol J. Miller, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: Is Rent Escrow the Solution or the Obstacle to Tenant’s Enforcement?, 25 CARDOZO J.
EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 1 app. (2018); see also Hales & Livingston, supra note 74, at 92–96
(detailing five rationales to justify rent withholding, all of which require landlord misconduct to
precede the tenants’ withholding of rent).
89. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 88, at 21.
90. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 4.105(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1972).
91. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 88, at 22.
92. See Michele Cotton, When Judges Don’t Follow the Law: Research and Recommendations, 19 CUNY L. REV. 57, 68–69 (2015).
93. See id. at 75.
94. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1946.2(b)(1)(A) (West 2010).
95. See Mary B. Spector, Tenants’ Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction and
the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 150–51, 159 (2000).
96. Id. at 159.
97. Id. at 154.
98. 405 U.S. 56, 64 (1972).
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proceedings aren’t efficient enough. 99 But tenant advocates worry that the
summary eviction process is so efficient that tenants are, in practice, denied
meaningful judicial review. 100
In some circumstances, rent strikes are legal under rent-withholding laws,
such as when all the striking tenants in a building reside in units in breach of
the warranty of habitability. 101 Much of the time, however, the law opposes
rent strikes. Rent strikes that are not protected under the law include those
where tenants are striking for something other than necessary repairs, such as
for affordable rents, or where the tenants on strike are not the ones facing the
issues but instead are striking in solidarity with the tenants requiring repairs. 102
Rent strikes can be successful even when the landlord has the legal right
to evict the tenant for withholding rent. For example, eviction courts require
tenants to deal with landlord-tenant disputes one-on-one and in isolation
from tenants in other units; 103 in a rent-strike action, tenants use this structure
to their advantage: when they collectively stop paying rent, they require the
landlord to bring so many individual failure-to-pay-rent actions that it would
be cheaper for the landlord to simply bargain with the tenants than go through
the courts. 104 Rent strikes are risky for tenants, exposing them to a high chance
of eviction, and they tend to follow earlier attempts to negotiate with the landlord and make a deal. A strike is used as a last resort when it is the only strategy
left between the tenant and eviction, displacement, or being left without access
to housing at all. 105 Still, most reforms fail to reduce, or even address, the risks
tenants take when seeking to enforce their rights or engage in collective bargaining.

99. Randy G. Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759, 791
(1994).
100. E.g., NAT’L HOUS. L. PROJECT, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO
EVICTIONS DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 1 (2020), https://www.nhlp.org/wp-content/uploads/procedural-due-process-covid-evictions.pdf [perma.cc/U8KM-CH6E].
101. Eliza Berkon, When Tenants Take On Landlords over Bad Conditions: A Rent-Strike
Explainer, NPR (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.npr.org/local/305/2020/02/27/809935489 [perma
.cc/D59E-AZ3Y].
102. See Rick Paulas, Do Rent Strikes Actually Work?, VICE (July 13, 2018, 12:16 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/a3qg3k/do-rent-strikes-work [perma.cc/427Z-PZXG].
103. See L.A. TENANTS UNION, supra note 69, at 48 (discussing the difficulties organizers
face in assembling tenant associations due to individual tenants’ needs to focus on their own
landlord-tenant disputes).
104. In the Boyle Heights mariachi rent strike, the public pressure on the landlord, the
picketing and protests by the tenants, and the number of tenants involved in the strike incentivized the landlord not to pursue eviction proceedings. See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying
text.
105. See Lang, supra note 58 (describing how rent strikes are “[o]ften viewed as a last resort
by tenant-rights groups”); Johnson, supra note 60, at 161.
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43. In LATU, tenants talk, strategize, and deal with individual crises—an
eviction notice, a leaking roof, a deportation threat, a landlord with a pickax—
but also learn how those individual crises are part of, caused by, and contribute
to, a collective one.
44. We teach each other the rights we have to defend our homes—rent control, the warranty of habitability—but also our rights to organize and protest.
—Tracy Jeanne Rosenthal, 101 Notes on the LA Tenants Union 106
Landlord-tenant reforms mainly focus on individual rights or housingmarket regulation, but they need to do more. Individual rights include the
warranty of habitability, 107 antidiscrimination rights, 108 and rights against a
landlord’s use of self-help 109—rights that protect an individual tenant from
landlord misconduct. Housing-market regulations directly impose restrictions on landlords and enforce those restrictions without involving the
tenant. Rent-control laws are a primary example. 110 Beyond these two prominent categories of reform is a third category: collective action rights. 111 Most
jurisdictions provide tenants with some collective-action rights, such as the
right not to be retaliated against for protesting. 112 This Part discusses how individual rights and housing-market regulation have been used to address tenants’ issues and why they are insufficient. It then argues that collective actionrights are a crucial element of landlord-tenant reform and that the right to
strike is a key form of collective action-rights that jurisdictions should provide
to tenants.

106. Rosenthal, supra note 1.
107. See supra Section I.C.
108. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
109. See Gerchick, supra note 99, at 773 n.53, 777 (explaining that most states have banned
landlord self-help, such as changing locks or removing tenants’ belongings, before a court orders
eviction).
110. See, e.g., N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-401 (McKinney 2012 & Supp. 2021).
111. This Note uses “collective-action rights” to mean legal rights that remove barriers to
organizing and support tenants’ ability to take action as a collective, including through protests,
collective bargaining, and rent strikes. The categories of individual rights, housing regulation,
and collective-action rights can often overlap: for example, as discussed infra in Section II.A,
rights that protect a tenant from retaliation when they engage in organizing are both individual
rights and rights that support collective action. Discussing housing reform through these categories, imperfect though they are, exposes the shortcomings of individual rights and housing
regulation absent strong collective action.
112. NON-LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON THE STUDY OF LANDLORD-TENANT LAWS,
REPORT TO GOVERNOR MIKE BEEBE, PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE, AND SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE 18 (2012), https://ualr.edu/lawreview/files/2013/01/Foster_Commission-Report.pdf [perma.cc/55PY-P96X].
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A. Individual Rights
Individual rights have played an essential role in protecting minorities
and “build[ing] solidarity among rights holders.” 113 Individual rights are especially powerful when activists wield them as part of a broader movement: in
the civil rights era, “the use of rights rhetoric was a radical, movement-building act.” 114 When it comes to the practical enforcement of tenants’ rights today, however, too much reliance on individual rights has troubling
consequences. The limits of individual rights stem from a variety of factors,
including access to the courts, judicial discretion, and landlords’ indifference
to or retaliation against the assertion of these rights. An analysis of when and
why individual rights fail to protect tenants can offer insight into the necessity
of alternative reforms, particularly enhanced collective-action-rights.
A useful example is the failure of the warranty of habitability to provide
low-income tenants with safe and habitable living conditions. When the Javins
court articulated the policy concerns motivating the establishment of the warranty of habitability, it envisioned a legal regime that would allow a tenant to
“legitimately expect that the apartment will be fit for habitation for the time
period for which it is rented.” 115 Today, almost all jurisdictions provide tenants the right to a habitable apartment. Yet uninhabitable living conditions
continue to be rampant in low-income rental housing. 116
The warranty of habitability fails to prevent uninhabitable rental-housing
conditions for a variety of reasons. Low-income tenants are often in a vulnerable position, and merely pursuing a remedy can make matters worse for the
tenant. 117 For example, low-income tenants often fall behind on rent or allow
family in need of housing to live with them as “unauthorized boarders”; the
landlord can use these areas of vulnerability against the tenants as soon as they
complain about housing conditions. 118 The flip side of retaliatory evictions is
the landlord’s indifference to rent withholding. Because tenants are required
to put money into escrow, the landlord can be assured that the money is there,

113. Paul D. Butler, Essay, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE
L.J. 2176, 2189 (2013); see Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 414 (1987).
114. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1365 (1988).
115. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
116. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
117. In Evicted, Matthew Desmond details the experiences of low-income tenants in Milwaukee who fear retaliatory eviction if they report conditions to a building inspector or withhold
rent. See DESMOND, supra note 41, at 75–76.
118. See id. at 64, 75–76. Relatedly, tenants in low-income housing may also fear reporting
to a building inspector because tenants will be left without access to housing if the building inspector responds by shutting the units downs. See Alana Semuels, How Housing Policy Is Failing
America’s Poor, ATLANTIC (June 24, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive
/2015/06/section-8-is-failing/396650 [perma.cc/Z7XD-UUP7].
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just not currently available to them. 119 Wealthy landlords, faced with the odd
tenant withholding rent, have little incentive to take immediate action and instead drag their feet on repairs.
The legal system itself poses many barriers to tenants pursuing legal remedies. While 90 percent of landlords have counsel in eviction hearings, only
10 percent of tenants do. 120 Having a lawyer makes a significant difference for
tenants: tenants with representation are far more likely to prevail than those
without, independent of the merits of the case. 121 But legal barriers extend beyond tenants’ difficulty in navigating a complex system. 122 Judicial discretion
and bias can also play a significant role. In Baltimore, tenants must receive
court approval before withholding rent in escrow. 123 Judges in Baltimore have
been reluctant to give approval, delaying tenants’ requests for months and
without apparent reason. 124 One judge admonished a tenant for using escrow
as “rent avoidance,” revealing potential bias against low-income tenants
whom the judge, without justification, suspected of illicit motives. 125 As these
examples demonstrate, overreliance on individual rights can create many barriers to actually addressing the issues low-income tenants experience.
The line between individual rights and collective-action rights, however,
is not a clear one, and the categories are often overlapping and context specific. Rights that protect a tenant from retaliation when they organize are both
individual rights and rights that support collective action. Antiretaliation law
provides a tenant with the individual right not to be retaliated against and
must be asserted in court by the individual tenant based on their own experience of retaliation; at the same time, the existence of the right encourages tenants to participate in collective strategies, thus bolstering organizing efforts. 126
The movement to guarantee tenants’ right to counsel is an example of how
individual rights can become collective-action rights in certain contexts.
When legal reformers call for a right to counsel outside of the context of a
broader movement, it perpetuates a system that makes tenants reliant on lawyers to protect their rights, and it accepts the typical landlord-tenant legal relationship that requires tenants to deal with their cases one by one, in isolation

119. Ronald Lawson, The Rent Strike in New York City, 1904–1980: The Evolution of a Social Movement Strategy, 10 J. URB. HIST. 235, 240–41 (1984); Johnson, supra note 60, at 162.
120. Matthew Desmond, Unaffordable America: Poverty, Housing, and Eviction, FAST
FOCUS (Univ. of Wis.–Madison Inst. for Rsch. on Poverty), Mar. 2015, at 1, 5, https://www.irp
.wisc.edu/publications/fastfocus/pdfs/FF22-2015.pdf [perma.cc/7VJR-YM5V].
121. Carroll Seron, Gregg Van Ryzin, Martin Frankel & Jean Kovath, The Impact of Legal
Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419, 419 (2001).
122. Cf. DESMOND, supra note 41, at 75 (“It was not that low-income renters didn’t know
their rights. They just knew those rights would cost them.”).
123. Cotton, supra note 92, at 65–68.
124. See id. at 69.
125. Id. at 77–78.
126. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5 (West 2010); Andrias & Sachs, supra note 14, at
620.
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from one another. Yet in New York City, tenant organizers pushed for the
establishment of the right to counsel, and it was leveraged as part of a broader
strategy “to increase the power of the tenant movement.” 127
By listening to tenants and paying careful attention to their ongoing organizing strategies, policymakers and legal scholars can identify legal strategies for supporting collective action that might otherwise seem to fall only in
the category of individual rights. In the context of rent strikes, procedural protections in the eviction process are one such reform, and their connection to
rent strikes is discussed in Section III.A.
B. Housing-Market Regulation
Landlord-tenant reform also comes in the form of housing-market regulation. Policymakers both set the terms of these regulations and enforce them.
Rent control is a primary example. Rent-control laws limit the rate at which
landlords can increase rent in a particular area. 128 In gentrifying areas, rentcontrol laws prevent the sudden, steep rent hikes that force low-income tenants out of their communities. They can thus promote stability and prevent
the displacement of communities of color. 129 Although tenants can recover
excess rent paid to a landlord charging above the limit, they are not expected
to enforce rent control through private actions. New York City’s rent-control
statute, for example, provides the city’s housing-rent agency the authority to
pursue court injunctions and fines against violating landlords. 130 Other examples of prominent housing-market regulation include inclusionary zoning and
rental-housing quality inspections. 131 These regulations take the burden off of
low-income tenants, who are often overworked and exhausted by the daily
consequences of systemic oppression, to create and implement solutions to
substandard housing and displacement. 132
A troubling feature of housing-market regulation as a mode of change,
however, is that it reserves the power and decisionmaking for policymakers,
leaving room for discrepancies between the tenants’ needs and the reforms
that ultimately get passed. The American political process is a system in which
127. Whitlow, supra note 9, at 1082.
128. For an overview of how rent-control laws work and how they vary across jurisdictions, see Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen & Sophia House, Laboratories of Regulation: Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041 (2019).
129. For one argument against the criticism that rent control decreases overall access to
affordable housing, see Dean Preston & Shanti Singh, Dear Business School Professors: You’re
Wrong, Rent Control Works, SHELTERFORCE (Mar. 28, 2018), https://shelterforce.org/2018/03
/28/rent-control-works [perma.cc/4PWG-257T].
130. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-516 (McKinney 2012).
131. See Weiss, supra note 9, at 253–54.
132. Cf. Elizabeth K. Julian, Segregation Now, Segregation Tomorrow, Segregation Forever?,
36 LAW & INEQ. 269, 272 (2018) (critiquing how nondiscrimination provisions often “put all the
burden of righting the historic wrongs done by the country to African Americans squarely on
the shoulders of individual victims of discrimination rather than on the architects and beneficiaries of segregation”).
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“the wealthy exercis[e] vastly disproportionate power over politics and government.” 133 Our democracy is rooted in deep political inequality that continues to perpetuate systemic oppression, and “elected officials are at best only
weakly accountable to nonwealthy constituents.” 134 As a result, tenants often
lack a voice in the political process, and policymakers decide on behalf of tenants what compromises should be made. Policymakers might choose to apply
stricter rent control in certain areas of the city, for example, rather than allow
for a higher limit on rent across the city. 135 This decision would have serious
implications for who can stay in their community and who gets priced out, yet
those making the decision are not the ones most affected by it. This perpetuates top-down decisionmaking rather than community-driven change.
When elected officials are responsive to the needs of low-income communities, it is often the result of grassroots organizing and mass mobilization
of the working class. 136 Rent-control laws in cities across the country were preceded by large-scale tenant movements pushing for the reform. 137 Lawmakers
should support the housing-market regulations that community activists call
for, but they should also prioritize community members’ ability to organize
for those changes in the first place. The necessary complement to housingmarket regulation as substantive policy reform is, in a sense, process reform—
that is, shifting how the process of making change takes place. The goal of
community organizers and grassroots leaders is not merely to change the substantive laws; it is to “change the severely disproportionate allocations of
power that create and reinforce the systems of oppression that produce unjust
laws and policies.” 138 When policymakers engage only in substantive housingmarket regulation without complementing those reforms with shifts in the
balance of power, they act as gatekeepers to the political process, withholding
for themselves the power to create meaningful change.
C. The Right to Strike
The Supreme Court has long expressed its respect for the role that collective action and organizing play in marginalized people’s access to justice. In

133. Andrias & Sachs, supra note 14, at 548.
134. Id. at 549.
135. This example is hypothetical, but it mirrors a decision that labor unions bargain over
with employers: whether to accept pay cuts for all employees or layoffs for some. See, e.g., LA
County Proposes Hard Pay Concessions as an Alternative to Lay-offs, SEIU 721 (May 29, 2020),
https://www.seiu721.org/2020/05/la-county-proposes-hard-pay-concessions-as-an-alternativeto-layoffs.php [perma.cc/X3JV-7CMX].
136. See Tim Iglesias, Housing Impact Assessments: Opening New Doors for State Housing
Regulation While Localism Persists, 82 OR. L. REV. 433, 485 (2003) (“Strong local housing movements are a primary reason why local governments attending to the housing needs of their residents actually do so.”).
137. See id.
138. Alexi Nunn Freeman & Jim Freeman, It’s About Power, Not Policy: Movement Lawyering for Large-Scale Social Change, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 147, 150 (2016).
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NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., for example, the Court upheld nonviolent
civil rights boycotts as constitutional, stating that “the practice of persons
sharing common views banding together to achieve a common end is deeply
embedded in the American political process. . . . [B]y collective effort individuals can make their views known, when, individually, their voices would be
faint or lost.”139 Thirty-two jurisdictions in the United States have passed antiretaliation laws for tenants engaged in organizing, signaling strong approval
across the country for tenants’ practice of “banding together” in pursuit of
common goals. 140
Although low-income people’s right to form a collective is theoretically
accepted, attempts to strengthen that collective and use it to exert economic
pressure are heavily scrutinized. The trajectory of labor law since the passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act reflects this tendency. Labor law scholars argue that
“[o]rganized labor is being strangled by laws that block workers from exercising the rights to organize, to strike, and to act in solidarity.” 141 Unions are
tightly monitored and face numerous restrictions on how and when they may
engage in collective bargaining. 142 The right to strike as a part of the collectivebargaining process has been cut back enormously: twelve years after the
NLRA was enacted, the Taft-Hartley Act significantly eroded the right to
strike for workers, 143 particularly for low-income workers. 144 Since then, a series of court and administrative decisions have cut back the right to strike even
further. 145
Strikes are controversial because they require the traditionally dominant
party—the employer, the landlord—to cede economic power. In valuing solutions such as arbitration over strikes, 146 courts expect employees to resolve

139. 458 U.S. 886, 907–08 (1982). In a twist of irony, this language is quoted from an earlier
Supreme Court case that upheld election contributions from a group lobbying against rent control. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294
(1981).
140. Bangs, supra note 18, at 58.
141. James Gray Pope, Ed Bruno & Peter Kellman, The Right to Strike, BOS. REV. (May 17,
2017), https://bostonreview.net/forum/james-gray-pope-ed-bruno-peter-kellman-right-strike
[perma.cc/WJ7Z-SEM9] (discussing constraints imposed by the NLRA’s “government-defined
‘bargaining unit’ boxes” and the system of exclusive representation).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Alex Gourevitch, The Right to Strike: A Radical View, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 905, 906
(2018) (“[L]ow-skill, high labor supply workers . . . are in a different situation. These kinds of
workers, in part because they are in such high supply, tend to have less bargaining power and
therefore usually enjoy lower wages, longer hours, and worse working conditions.”).
145. See, e.g., Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Elk
Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950).
146. See Boys Mkts., 398 U.S. at 252 (overruling a decision for the purpose of protecting
the “effectiveness of the arbitration technique as a method peacefully to resolve industrial disputes without resort to strikes”).
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class struggles with little or no concessions of power from employers. Rejecting this framework in the context of tenants unions, the Autonomous Tenants
Union Network states in its Points of Unity,
We assert that the interests of landlords and tenants are fundamentally irreconcilable, and we reject any policy that attempts to paper over this conflict. While we do not rule out on principle the possibility of temporary
truces and agreements between landlord and tenant, we advocate for a strategy of class struggle. 147

Property law scholars frequently give in to the temptation to paper over class
struggle in the context of landlord-tenant law. 148 One criticism of rent strikes
is that, despite instances of substandard housing and unaffordable rent prices,
strikes are an unreasonable form of coercion against landlords. 149 This criticism signals a disregard for deeply embedded class conflicts at play and a view
of the struggles low-income tenants face as stemming from isolated “social
wrongs” rather than interconnected cycles of poverty and oppression that
property law perpetuates. 150
To justify strikes in the employee context, Professor Alex Gourevitch
gives an account of “oppression in class societies,” in which systemic, longterm oppression causes some people to have no option but to work for others. 151 Employees thus become “de jure and de facto subordinates to a specific
employer.” 152 The employer can “exercis[e] legally permitted prerogatives,”
such as requiring workers to work in extreme heat and hazardous conditions. 153 The employer can also go beyond legal prerogative to “tak[e] advantage of the material power that comes with threatening to fire or otherwise
discipline workers,” such as by threatening immigrant workers with deportation to pay them illegally low wages or deny them legally required lunch
breaks. 154 This oppression has a distributive effect, ensuring the wealthy and

147. Who We Are, supra note 67.
148. One popular property law casebook teaches its students that “[p]ersons who have not
accumulated much in the way of assets and/or have poor credit will often prefer to lease assets
rather than purchase them”—as if homeownership is a choice low-income tenants have simply
opted not to take. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 644 (3d ed. 2016) (emphasis added); see also Myron Moskovitz & Peter J. Honigsberg,
The Tenant Union-Landlord Relations Act: A Proposal, 58 GEO. L.J. 1013, 1017 (1970) (arguing
that legislatures need to place a check on the “moral and tactical judgment[s]” tenants make
when deciding to strike, thus facilitating the “peace-making process” between landlord and tenant).
149. G. Richard Gold, Note, Rent Strike—Landlord’s Remedies, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV.
740, 740 (1970); see also Springfield, Bayside Corp. v. Hochman, 255 N.Y.S.2d 140, 145 (Sup. Ct.
1964) (enjoining tenants from picketing outside landlord’s house because they were “seeking
economically to coerce the plaintiff into meeting their demands”).
150. See Gold, supra note 149, at 740.
151. Gourevitch, supra note 144, at 907.
152. Id. at 909 (emphasis omitted).
153. Id. at 908.
154. Id.
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powerful retain their wealth and power and workers remain in an ongoing,
subordinate position to employers. 155
The landlord-tenant relationship is characterized by a similar cycle of
subordination and oppression. The history of land ownership in the United
States as it exists today began with a property regime in which “Native Americans were killed and dispossessed from land and Black bodies were treated as
objects of property as slaves and used to settle space.” 156 The following centuries of racist economic discrimination generally, and housing discrimination
specifically, have left many low-income people of color with no option but to
rent their housing. 157 Tenants are legally subordinated to their landlords, lacking essential rights to control their housing. Like employers in relation to employees, landlords can exert de jure and de facto power over tenants. They can
legally increase rent arbitrarily to price their tenant out. And they can take
advantage of low-income tenants’ vulnerabilities, harassing tenants or leaving
them to deal with uninhabitable housing conditions without facing legal ramifications. The landlord-tenant structure perpetuates class oppression in the
housing market, reproducing the same allocations of property ownership and
control of housing over time. 158 This view elaborates on the Autonomous Tenants Union Network’s characterization of the landlord-tenant relationship as
one fundamentally based on “class struggle.” As such, the right to strike for
both workers and tenants can be viewed as the “right to resist oppression.”159
Rent strikes are about more than just leveling bargaining power between the
parties; they are a valuable strategy for low-income tenants to assert the human right to decent housing and achieve “control [over] their own housing.” 160
Laws supporting tenant rent strikes do not cut against tenants’ individual
rights or housing-market regulation. Rather, enhanced collective-action
rights, including rent-strike legislation, would bolster other legal reforms. In
relation to individual rights, rent-strike legislation can serve as an enforcement mechanism. Tenants who cannot withhold rent on their own, whether
because of judicial barriers or fear of retaliation, would have the support and
protection of the striking collective. A landlord who ignored the complaints
of one tenant would have the incentive, and perhaps the legal obligation, to
bargain with the collective. Rent strikes encourage the landlord to negotiate a
deal outside the courts, thus minimizing the barriers of the judicial process

155. Id. at 909.
156. Safransky, supra note 26, at 1086.
157. See id.
158. DESMOND, supra note 41, at 251 (describing how low-income tenants’ vulnerability
to eviction perpetuates cycles of poverty and housing instability); id. at 307 (“Large-scale historical and structural changes have given urban landlords the opportunity to make good money,
sometimes spectacular money, by providing housing to struggling families.”).
159. Gourevitch, supra note 144, at 909.
160. Rosenthal, supra note 1.
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and the reliance on legal counsel. In this way, rent strikes make up for gaps in
the existing enforcement infrastructure for individual rights.
Beyond enforcing the bare minimum required at law, rent-strike legislation would support tenants as they build more power in policymaking and
private bargaining. The difference between these objectives is comparable to
the difference between advocating for a federal minimum wage and advocating for workers’ right to strike so that they can set their own wage and benefits.
The goals go hand in hand. As tenants build power in private bargaining, they
will be able to negotiate for better terms in lease agreements—namely, though
not exclusively, for affordable rent. Smaller, incremental efforts between a tenants association and a single landlord will feed into the broader strategy of
building power for the union. 161 And as tenants unions across the country gain
more power, more tenant-driven policy reforms can take shape. As successful
tenant organizing has already demonstrated, rent strikes have potential to
counter the displacement and colonization of Black and brown communities
in America in a way that the law has failed to do. And in both large- and smallscale efforts toward change, rent strikes promote tenants’ autonomy and control over their circumstances. Legal reformers should follow the lead of tenant
organizers, heeding their visions and strategies for justice as instructive. 162
D. Reframing Rent Strike Legislation Toward Tenant Power
As policymakers and legal scholars consider how to support rent strikes,
they must ensure the legislation they promote does not overregulate tenants
unions, stymieing grassroots movements in favor of a carefully monitored
regulatory regime. Past efforts to protect tenants’ rights to collectively bargain
and organize rent strikes have fallen into the trap of attempting to replace or
control organizing rather than support it. 163 For instance, public-interest lawyer Elizabeth K. Johnson proposed that a Landlord-Tenant Relations Board
should hear cases regarding a hypothetical requirement that landlords bargain
in good faith, using its discretion to allow tenants to withhold rent when the
landlord violates this duty. 164 She further proposed that when the parties have
bargained to an impasse, tenants should be allowed to withhold rent only if
they put an additional amount beyond their rent value into an escrow account;
this additional amount would not be returned to tenants but rather used for
low-income housing development. 165 These proposals have as much potential
161. See Andrias & Sachs, supra note 14, at 623–27.
162. Cf. Kate Andrias, Peril and Possibility: Strikes, Rights, and Legal Change in the Age of
Trump, 40 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 135, 147 (2019).
163. See Johnson, supra note 60; Moskovitz & Honigsberg, supra note 148. A few student
pieces on tenants unions preceded these proposals. See, e.g., Note, Tenant Unions: Collective
Bargaining and the Low-Income Tenant, 77 YALE L.J. 1368 (1968); Samuel A. Simon, Comment,
Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for a National Tenants’ Association, 47 TEX. L. REV.
1160 (1969).
164. Johnson, supra note 60, at 164.
165. Id. at 164–65.
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to hinder tenant organizing as they do to support it. They create additional
hoops for tenants to jump through, some of which will be impossible to satisfy,
especially where large amounts must be placed in escrow.
More troubling, however, is that these proposals express their own ex ante
value judgments on strikes. They say to tenants: only when your strikes satisfy
our understanding of what a proper strike is will our laws protect you from
legal repercussions. This approach is objectionable for two reasons. First, no
matter how airtight a proposal is, tenants will still face legal repercussions if
they rely only on the laws and not on organizing and other collective strategies. As history teaches us, laws are easily misused, underenforced, and cabined to the point of becoming ineffective. 166 Second, legal reformers should
not take on the role of making value judgments about what types of strategies
or actions are politically acceptable. This is one of the great failures of labor
law: policymakers imposed their own value judgments on labor organizing,
shaping which strikes are legally acceptable and allowing strikes that fall outside of the legal framework to be publicly condemned. 167
Johnson frames her proposal with the question, “should the rent strike be
institutionalized?” 168 This is the wrong question. Legal scholars like Johnson
should not ask how to institutionalize organizing strategies. They should instead ask how to support organizing while allowing grassroots movements to
maintain independence, control, and decisionmaking over the organizing
strategy and its implementation.
III. ENVISIONING RENT STRIKE LEGISLATION
79. As a tactic, rent strikes demonstrate the underlying force of our union:
Even when we have no laws to protect us as tenants, we still have each other.
80. Though they are not supported by City Council members, though they’re
discouraged by the Housing Department and limited by court decisions, rent
strikes sometimes get the goods.
—Tracy Jeanne Rosenthal, 101 Notes on the LA Tenants Union 169
Rent strike legislation should aim to give tenants additional tools in their
toolbox when engaging in rent strikes, rather than creating a new regulatory
structure within which strikes must take place. The following proposals are,

166. See supra Section II.A; notes 141–145 and accompanying text.
167. For example, after the 2018 West Virginia teachers strike, West Virginia lawmakers
passed a bill to clarify that teachers strikes are not legal. Much of the rhetoric surrounding the
bill condemned the teachers for “leav[ing] kids hanging” and for allowing the strike to jeopardize, as the lawmakers saw it, student wellness. Larisa Casillas, West Virginia Passes Bill That
Cracks Down on Public Employee Strikes, WTRF (Feb. 23, 2021, 7:19 AM), https://www.wtrf.com
/news/west-virginia-headlines/west-virginia-passes-bill-that-cracks-down-on-public-employeestrikes [perma.cc/5AFX-TMJX].
168. Johnson, supra note 60, at 138.
169. Rosenthal, supra note 1.
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first and foremost, suggestions for community organizers, tenants, and legal
advocates as they consider options for organizing around better rent-strike
protections. This Note does not address specific implementation of the reforms, such as whether to enact brand new legislation, add onto existing protections, or repeal laws that inhibit rent strikes. The implementation will vary
across jurisdictions and according to the strategies of local tenant organizers.
In addition, these proposals aim to illustrate to policymakers and legal scholars an approach to rent-strike legislation rooted in a movement law methodology, in which reforms can support the work of tenant organizers instead of
controlling or stymieing it.
A. Enhancing Procedural Protections in Eviction Court
Even when tenants have little to no legal basis for withholding rent, their
rent strikes can still be successful, in part because the eviction process disincentivizes landlords from immediately evicting tenants and shutting down the
strike. Evictions cost money, including court costs and attorneys’ fees. 170 Each
eviction claim can only be brought against the tenants in a single unit. 171 The
more expensive and time-consuming the eviction process is, the more these
costs will add up, especially when a large number of tenants strike at the same
time. Additional procedural protections in the eviction process will incentivize the landlord to bargain with the striking tenants before resorting to eviction. 172
One option to enhance procedural protections is to increase the cost of
filing for eviction, thus further disincentivizing the landlord from bringing
evictions. 173 More directly, the legislature could limit the number of evictions
a landlord may file in a particular period of time, slowing down the rate at
which evictions can be filed and preventing a landlord from evicting all the
tenants in a building at once. Finally, more time between notice and subsequent court hearings could support strikes by drawing out the eviction process
and giving tenants more time to carry out other aspects of their organizing
campaign. 174

170. Gold, supra note 149, at 749–50; Stephen Michael White, Court Costs for Eviction: Is
It Worth What It Will Cost You?, RENTPREP (Oct. 16, 2018), https://rentprep.com/evictions
/court-costs-for-eviction [perma.cc/N6Z6-LE8F].
171. See Gold, supra note 149, at 749.
172. See id. at 748.
173. Scholars Philip Garboden and Eva Rosen highlight the difference between “an eviction that is executed for the purposes of removing the tenant” and one “that is filed for the purposes of getting a tenant to pay, or modifying a tenant’s behavior.” Philip M.E. Garboden & Eva
Rosen, Serial Filing: How Landlords Use the Threat of Eviction, 18 CITY & CMTY. 638, 655 (2019).
For eviction filings in the latter category—including, in some instances, eviction filings meant to
break up a rent strike—protections in later stages of the eviction process would be less effective,
because the landlord would have achieved his purpose simply by filing the claim. Id. at 656.
174. Cf. Spector, supra note 95, at 207 (arguing that summary eviction proceedings do not
provide tenants enough time to prepare defenses related to landlord misconduct). Courts point
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B. Controlling the Money
When the law allows tenants to withhold rent, it often requires them to
put their rent into an escrow account. 175 Escrow accounts are one of the main
ways policymakers signal their desire to control and monitor strikers. The escrow requirement is justified by the goal of “mitigat[ing] the possibility of badfaith tenants using the breach of warranty defense merely as an excuse to avoid
paying rent.” 176 This reasoning reflects the lack of trust policymakers and
judges have in low-income tenants. 177
The law can give tenants more autonomy over rent strikes by allowing
them to use rent withholding as a true self-help mechanism. When courts require tenants to receive court approval before the tenant can even begin to
withhold rent, the law undermines goals of valuing and enhancing tenant autonomy and control. In some instances, the escrow account might benefit the
strike strategy because judges will be more open to the tenants’ underlying
defenses if they know where the money is going. 178 But whether escrow will
benefit the strike is a decision of organizing strategy better left to the tenants
rather than to policymakers disconnected from the context of the strike at
hand. One option would be to require tenants to set rent aside in an escrow
account but give them full autonomy to decide when and how to open the
escrow account. 179 Although this would be an improvement, it could still create challenges for striking tenants: so long as tenants must place an unaffordable amount into escrow, the escrow requirement would undermine the rent
strike.
Escrow requirements gut the legality of tenants’ right to strike and bargain
over the amount of rent owed, thus undermining a significant category of rent
strikes. Rent strikes sometimes occur when tenants can pay rent but do not do
so because, for example, the property requires repairs. But this is not the only
time when tenants strike. 180 Tenants also strike when unexpected circumstances cause the tenants to be unable to pay rent—such as the landlord suddenly increasing rent by 80 percent or a global pandemic causing twenty-two

to judicial efficiency as a justification for summary eviction procedures. See, e.g., Dolan v. Linnen, 753 N.Y.S.2d 682, 688 (Civ. Ct. 2003). If the process is too efficient, however, it will undermine the tenant’s access to justice and a fair process. The Supreme Court has held that summary
eviction proceedings satisfy constitutional due-process requirements. Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56, 64 (1972). But some scholars argue that summary eviction proceedings are “designed
for speed rather than fairness” and allow the landlord-tenant relationship to “avoid[] judicial
scrutiny.” Spector, supra note 95, at 137.
175. See supra Section I.C.
176. Phillips & Miller, supra note 88, at 21.
177. See supra Section II.A.
178. See Lawson, supra note 119, at 240–42.
179. See, e.g., Stuart Katz, Rent Strikes and the Law: The Ann Arbor Experience, 1 YALE REV.
L. & SOC. ACTION 13, 17 (1970) (discussing how the transition from independent escrow accounts to court-controlled escrow accounts “cripple[d] tenant control over escrow money”).
180. Berkon, supra note 101.
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million people to lose their jobs. 181 When this type of strike is successful, it will
result in a bargain with the landlord that decreases the overall amount owed.
In the Boyle Heights mariachi strike, part of the final bargain was to require
only a percentage of the withheld rent to be paid back as well as to cap rent
increases going forward. 182 Until the landlord finally agreed to negotiate with
the tenants, there was no way to know what amount of back rent the tenants
would have to pay pursuant to the eventual negotiated agreement.
The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the urgency of strong collective action and mobilizing among the working class. If rent-strike legislation does
not support the type of rent strikes necessary to respond to the circumstances
posed by the pandemic, then it fails to sufficiently support the organizing our
country needs. Some critiques of COVID-19 rent strikes point out that, due
to the pandemic, the landlord is also struggling. 183 This argument, however,
assumes that landlords should expect to make the same (or even more184)
profit in the aftermath of the pandemic—a view that prioritizes profit over
tenants’ access to safe housing and ignores the inherent power imbalance existing today between landlord and tenant. Where the landlord refuses to negotiate with the tenant or prices rent exorbitantly high, a rent strike is justified
even—or perhaps especially—during the pandemic. To support rent strikes
such as those during COVID-19, lawmakers must not require tenants to set
aside more money than an eventual agreement with the landlord may require
them to pay. Because there is no way to know what those terms might be, tenants should not be required to set aside rent into escrow before taking advantage of rent-withholding laws.

181. Jonathan Ponciano, It Could Take 4 Years to Recover the 22 Million Jobs Lost During
Covid-19 Pandemic, Moody’s Warns, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2020, 7:20 PM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/jonathanponciano/2020/11/30/it-could-take-4-years-to-regain-the-22-million-jobs-lostduring-covid-19-pandemic-moodys-warns [perma.cc/6J3T-G34J].
182. Chiland, supra note 5.
183. See, e.g., Abby Vesoulis, How Eviction Moratoriums Are Hurting Small Landlords—
and Why That’s Bad for the Future of Affordable Housing, TIME (June 11, 2020, 10:08 AM),
https://time.com/5846383/coronavirus-small-landlords [perma.cc/QPS8-SBZV]. However, this
will not apply in every case, as many landlords received COVID-19 mortgage assistance from
banks and the government that they did not pass on to tenants in the form of rent breaks. Mordecai Lyon, Should There Be a COVID-19 Rent Strike?, BOS. REV. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://bostonreview.net/class-inequality/mordecai-lyon-COVID-19-rent-strike [perma.cc/4VM2-CPKD].
184. In the pandemic, many tenants lost rent-controlled units because they fell behind on
rent. After the landlord evicts tenants in a rent-controlled unit, the landlord can hike up rent
significantly. Landlords were thus incentivized to use the pandemic as an excuse to push out
tenants in rent-controlled units and profit substantially from the suffering that COVID-19
caused. See, e.g., Press Release, City of Santa Monica, City Sues Landlords for Fraudulently Trying to Evict Rent-Controlled Tenants During Pandemic (Feb. 3, 2021, 10:47 AM),
https://www.santamonica.gov/press/2021/02/03/city-sues-landlords-for-fraudulently-tryingto-evict-rent-controlled-tenants-during-pandemic [perma.cc/A624-AUJ4].
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C. Creating and Enforcing a Duty to Bargain in Good Faith
Another way to support rent strikes is through a duty to bargain in good
faith. Landlords often refuse to engage with tenants, prohibiting any means of
negotiating for better conditions or affordable prices. As issues arise, a duty to
bargain in good faith would encourage landlords to work with tenants to keep
them in the units. By denying tenants a right to bargain with the landlord, the
law instead encourages landlords to ignore their tenants’ needs and view eviction as a convenient means of avoiding conflict resolution. Aligning the duty
to bargain in good faith with ongoing rent-strike strategies would require a
two-step process: first, jurisdictions should enact a duty to bargain in good
faith; second, tenants should be able to enforce that duty through self-help
rent withholding.
The first step—enacting a duty to bargain in good faith—has strong precedent in labor law, where the law imposes a duty on employers to bargain in
good faith with their employees. Under the NLRA, it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer to “refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees,” and the representatives of the employer and employees must
“confer in good faith” when negotiating. 185 The COVID-19 pandemic has left
low-income tenants with no jobs, enormous rent debt, and impending threats
of eviction. 186 Tenants should have been able to expect to bargain with their
landlord about paying back whatever portion of this debt was feasible instead
of facing the possibility of immediate eviction as soon as the eviction moratorium was lifted. And if a landlord refuses to engage in a scenario like this, tenants should have the right to strike. The circumstances of the pandemic bring
to light the constantly changing nature of the issues tenants face, some of
which could not have been anticipated in the tenants’ original lease agreements. This should not be a reason that a family loses their housing. Instead,
the law should support tenants’ ability to renegotiate the terms of the lease in
light of changing and difficult circumstances.
On top of changing circumstances out of both landlords’ and tenants’
control, an issue that motivates tenants to strike is a landlord’s decision to set
sudden and overbearing rent increases. 187 Dramatic rent increases have been
forcing tenants out of their neighborhoods for decades. 188 For landlords, the
rent increase is often a strategic effort to push out low-income tenants in order

185. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d). In the labor law context, however, this requirement is insufficient without strong organizing, including the use of protests and strikes, to help enforce it.
See Andrias & Sachs, supra note 14, at 625.
186. Jaboa Lake, The Pandemic Has Exacerbated Housing Instability for Renters of Color,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 30, 2020, 9:02 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues
/poverty/reports/2020/10/30/492606/pandemic-exacerbated-housing-instability-renters-color
[perma.cc/72PD-APT9].
187. See Lyon, supra note 183.
188. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
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to remodel and attract a higher-class clientele. 189 In a jurisdiction with a landlord’s duty to bargain in good faith, a landlord would fail to satisfy this duty if
he demands more than he can expect his tenants to pay in an effort to get out
of a deal. Bad-faith pricing could thus be prima facie evidence of a failure to
bargain in good faith, allowing an evidentiary inquiry into whether the landlord raised the rent for the purpose of pricing tenants out. Tying a right to
withhold rent to a landlord’s effort to overprice units in bad faith would further align rent withholding with tenants’ ongoing rent-strike strategies.
Justice Scalia indicated disfavor toward landlords who act in bad faith
when setting rent prices and supported regulation against this practice. In
Pennell v. City of San Jose, he wrote that when landlords price their property
so as to “produce[] exorbitant returns,” the landlord is responsible for the resulting hardship on tenants and “singling [the landlord] out to relieve [the
hardship] may not be regarded as ‘unfair.’ ” 190 Justice Scalia wrote this in the
context of rent control regulations to argue that rent control is justified in
cases where the landlord is responsible for the hardship on the tenant and not
as a broader regulation. 191 Because this Note’s proposed rent withholding
would be brought to court as an individual tenant’s defense against eviction,
it would fit well with Justice Scalia’s argument for a case-by-case inquiry into
the landlord’s fault in overpricing units.
The second step—expanding rent withholding to failures of a landlord’s
duty to bargain in good faith—is not in conflict with rent withholding’s underlying doctrinal basis. Rent withholding is currently allowed when the landlord fails to properly maintain the premises. 192 Although rent withholding is
often contemplated as a remedy for lost property value (that is, the tenants are
not getting what they paid for because the property is in such poor quality, so
they should be able to withhold their rent), this explanation falls short. 193
While repair-and-deduct statutes allow the tenant to withhold exactly the
amount needed to remedy the breach, rent-withholding laws can go further,
allowing a tenant to withhold more than what is needed to address the problem. 194 And even when the market for rental units has adjusted so that the
rental value reflects the value of the damaged property (that is, the tenant is
getting what they have paid for), rent withholding is still permitted. 195

189. Lambert, supra note 2.
190. 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191. Id.
192. See supra Section I.C.
193. See, e.g., Thomas E. Martin, Jr., Common Law Residential Rent Withholding—a Call
for Legislative Action, 79 PA. BAR ASS’N Q. 72, 74 (2008).
194. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.100 (2021) (repair-and-deduct); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 239, § 8A (2020) (rent withholding).
195. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 148, at 692.
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The justification behind the rent-withholding doctrine can instead be understood to arise from landlord misconduct more generally. 196 The Javins
court held that “the tenant’s obligation to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord’s performance of his obligations, including his warranty to maintain the
premises in habitable condition.” 197 Under this explanation, the warranty of
habitability is offered as just one example of the sort of landlord misconduct
that can justify rent withholding. Where landlords fail to meet other important duties, the same reasoning should apply. As such, jurisdictions can
specify other forms of landlord misconduct—such as the failure to bargain in
good faith—for which tenants may legally withhold rent.
Of course, enacting new rights for which tenants may withhold rent runs
into the same problems that the warranty of habitability already has: tenants
without an attorney might struggle to assert these rights as a defense at an
eviction hearing, and new rights still leave room for abuse and judicial discretion. 198 At the end of the day, however, it is the organizing—not a judge’s eventual determination of legality—that will make the strike successful. The
purpose of these proposals is to provide legal backing to actions that tenants
are taking. More robust legal backing for rent withholding increases the possibility that tenants will prevail if a landlord responds to the strike by filing for
eviction. And as the law gives the tenant more possibilities of prevailing, the
landlord’s odds in turn diminish. This increased chance of prevailing will encourage more tenants to participate in the strike, disincentivize risk-averse
lawyers from undermining tenant organizers’ strategy by trying to convince
tenants not to participate, and help bring landlords to the bargaining table by
reducing their certainty of prevailing in eviction court.
D. Employing Rent Withholding as a Solidarity Right
To further address the insufficient protections of individual rights, statutory provisions allowing these rights to be used in solidarity with other tenants, or as a “solidarity right,” would support rent strikes. Under current law,
when a tenant is allowed to withhold rent, they are allowed to do so in response to breaches of warranties that are implied or expressed in that tenant’s
lease agreement. Yet the experiences of tenants, especially tenants who share
a landlord, are interconnected. Rent-withholding laws can recognize tenants’
interconnectedness by allowing all tenants with the same landlord—not just
those with a habitability issue in their apartment—to strike whenever a landlord fails to comply with the warranty of habitability.
196. Compare Bakirdan v. Ferguson, No.3-11-0004, 2012 WL 7005358, at *3 (Ill. App. Ct.
Apr. 30, 2012) (holding that under a repair-and-deduct law, “[t]he tenant must submit the paid
bill, from an appropriate tradesman, to the landlord,” only after which may she “deduct from
her rent the cost of repairs” (citation omitted)), with Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that under a rent-withholding rule, “the tenant’s obligation
to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord’s performance of his obligations”).
197. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1082.
198. See supra Section II.A.
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When it comes to grievances in the workplace, striking in solidarity with
others is well established. 199 Section 7 of the NLRA protects “concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 200 In 1942, Judge Learned Hand wrote:
When all the other workmen in a shop make common cause with a fellow
workman over his separate grievance, and go out on strike in his support,
they engage in a “concerted activity” for “mutual aid or protection,” although
the aggrieved workman is the only one of them who has any immediate stake
in the outcome. The rest know that by their action each one of them assures
himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the support of the one whom they are
all then helping; and the solidarity so established is “mutual aid” in the most
literal sense, as nobody doubts. 201

The Boyle Heights mariachi strike is one example of tenants striking in accordance with Judge Hand’s account. When the landlord increased rent, he
only increased it for six tenants. 202 But tenants whose rent was not increased
still decided to join the rent strike. 203 One tenant, Jose Sánchez, described this
decision as an act of solidarity. “We knew they were going to evict us in
groups,” Sánchez said. “In solidarity with the others, we said they’re coming
for us next, and we stood with our neighbors.” 204
Rent withholding as a solidarity right should also extend to tenants who
would otherwise be barred from withholding rent because of issues specific to
their case. Jurisdictions often prevent a tenant behind on rent from asserting
their individual rights. 205 But preventing a tenant from participating in collective action because of their individual vulnerabilities—struggling to make
enough to pay rent and falling behind, for example—runs counter to the notion of solidarity. Instead, a tenant should be permitted to withhold rent as
part of a rent strike and use the strike as a defense to eviction even if they were
already behind on rent at the inception of the strike.
This aspect of solidarity would likely receive more pushback. It could, in
effect, put a pause on the landlord’s ability to evict any tenant for the duration
of the strike, because any tenant already behind on rent could use the strike as

199. See What’s the Law?, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect
/whats-law [perma.cc/2AB2-FFY7] (“[T]he National Labor Relations Act protects your right to
band together with coworkers to improve your lives at work.”).
200. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
201. NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505–06 (2d Cir.
1942). The Taft-Hartley Act has limited the scope of solidarity strikes by prohibiting “secondary
boycotts,” or strikes against employers by members of a different union. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(b).
202. Jason McGahan, Boyle Heights Mariachis Take a Win Against an 80% Rent Hike, L.A.
TACO (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.lataco.com/boyle-heights-mariachis-take-win-80-rent-hike
[perma.cc/5QX7-RK8Z].
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5(a) (West 2010).
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a defense to eviction. This effect should be embraced. Courts and legal scholars are far too concerned with searching for a tenant’s worst intent—for example, that rent withholding is used “merely as a pretext by tenants who
cannot or will not pay lawfully due rent” 206—and not concerned enough with
holding landlords who fail to meet their obligations as property owners accountable. The fact that a tenant may have several reasons to withhold rent
does not undermine a strike’s validity. Whether the rent withholding is “pretext” should be based only on an inquiry into whether the landlord has in fact
failed to meet his duties (that is, whether the strike itself is justified). No other
inquiry into why a tenant is withholding rent is warranted.
The law as it currently stands asks tenants to “[s]trik[e] a balance between
the organizing efforts and the legal battle.” 207 While the organizing efforts require tenants to see themselves as part of an interconnected struggle, their legal case can isolate them from the issues of other tenants and “contradict
efforts to build collective power.” 208 To support rent strikes as an important
form of tenant organizing, the law must encourage solidarity. It must support
tenants like Jose Sánchez who choose to stand with their neighbors to fight for
safe and affordable housing in their own communities. This solidarity right
can be achieved by guaranteeing tenants the right to strike in the two circumstances discussed above: when another tenant with the same landlord has a
right to withhold rent, and when the striking tenant might otherwise be precluded from asserting their rights due to prior default on rent or other issues.
CONCLUSION
The material benefits of this Note’s proposals extend only as far as their
likelihood of being enacted into law. In most United States jurisdictions, these
proposals may seem like nonstarters. But for those advocating for legal reform—whether through the power of a legislator’s vote or through the pages
of a law review article—the takeaway of this Note should not be that the considerations here are fruitless. The purpose of these policy proposals is not to
delineate the reforms that are necessary for legal reformers to begin to take
rent strikes seriously. Rather, it is to argue that they should already be taking
rent strikes seriously as an important organizing strategy—and, in any legal
reform they choose to pursue, they should follow a method of law reform
based in collaboration with communities and deference to the communities’
creative visions and strategies for change.
In presenting this argument, this Note participates in the practice of challenging assumptions and norms associated with property law: encouraging
ways of valuing neighborhoods based on more than their market value to developers and proposing an orientation toward property law that views rent
206. Martin, supra note 193, at 75; see also Cotton, supra note 92, at 68.
207. L.A. TENANTS UNION, supra note 69, at 48.
208. Id.; Akbar et al., supra note 24, at 870 (describing the potential for “public-interest
legal practice [to] reinstantiate the lawyerly idea of the client’s individuated ‘problem’ in ways
that undermine collective power building”).
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strikes as a form of the “right to resist oppression” rather than as illegal violations of landlords’ property rights. 209 Tenants engaging in rent strikes are living out these values, and it is the task of policymakers, lawyers, and legal
scholars to be allies and collaborators with tenants as they “outlin[e] the blueprint of a new” landlord-tenant law. 210

209. Gourevitch, supra note 144, at 909; see Murray, supra note 51; see also supra note 65
and accompanying text.
210. Andrias, supra note 162, at 148.

